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Abstract
Controlling severe outbreaks remains the most important problem in infectious disease area. With time, this problem will
only become more severe as population density in urban centers grows. Social interactions play a very important role in
determining how infectious diseases spread, and organization of people along social lines gives rise to non-spatial networks
in which the infections spread. Infection networks are different for diseases with different transmission modes, but are likely
to be identical or highly similar for diseases that spread the same way. Hence, infection networks estimated from common
infections can be useful to contain epidemics of a more severe disease with the same transmission mode. Here we present a
proof-of-concept study demonstrating the effectiveness of epidemic mitigation based on such estimated infection
networks. We first generate artificial social networks of different sizes and average degrees, but with roughly the same
clustering characteristic. We then start SIR epidemics on these networks, censor the simulated incidences, and use them to
reconstruct the infection network. We then efficiently fragment the estimated network by removing the smallest number of
nodes identified by a graph partitioning algorithm. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this targeted strategy, by
comparing it against traditional untargeted strategies, in slowing down and reducing the size of advancing epidemics.
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Introduction
Understanding and containing the spread of an infectious
disease has always attracted a lot of interest from the scientific
community, and even more so after the recent SARS and H1N1
outbreaks. Besides their social and healthcare impacts, severe
infectious disease outbreaks also present an important burden to
the economy through the decrease in productivity and high cost of
treatment. As denser populations promote faster spreading, this
problem can only grow in severity and magnitude with the
increasing world population density. Motivated by this, many
works have been done to predict [1,2] or even contain [3–6] the
spread of severe epidemics. In spite of these efforts, effective
control of infectious disease outbreaks continues to elude us.
A recent important advancement in the field is the application
of network theory to study epidemic dynamics. Network-based
models have been shown able to accurately explain complex
phenomena in terms of the relatively-simple interactions between
its small constituents, and are therefore broadly applicable to
various different fields [7]. In the area of infectious diseases,
numerous studies have been done on modeling epidemic using a
network approach - mainly covering sexually-transmitted infec-
tions [8–11], respiratory and flu-like diseases [2], and general
features of infectious disease dynamics [12–17].
From the network point of view, we speculate that different
infectious diseases might have very similar infection networks if
they share the same mode of transmission. In particular, we
believe that severe respiratory infections such as H1N1 and SARS
share an infection network similar to that of the less severe
common cold. Hence, infection network inferred from the latter
can be useful in controlling rare outbreaks of the former.
Estimating the infection network from common infections has
the advantage of a large volume of daily incidences. As we will
show in the Results section, the volume of incidences data
gathered is critical in getting accurate estimation of the network.
Traditional epidemic intervention procedures, such as quaran-
tine and other social distancing measures, involve weakening or
cutting links around the infected nodes. However, these proce-
dures are not systematic from the network point of view. A more
effective intervention strategy would employ understanding the
‘shape’ of the infection network and applying that knowledge to
efficiently tear the network apart. This can be done by targeting
nodes that play important roles in the network (i.e. the ‘hubs’), and
the ‘backbones’ connecting one hub to another.
Based on the above ideas, we proposed a targeted method to
effectively contain infectious disease epidemics. This strategy
involves estimating the infection network of a severe disease using
incidences data from common infections sharing the same
infection network, and fragmenting the network into disconnected
pieces using a graph partitioning method. To test the proposed
strategy in principle, we first generate artificial social networks of
different sizes but with roughly the same clustering characteristics
to serve as our infection networks. Then we simulate multiple SIR
epidemics on the networks to play the role of common infections
circulating in society. We apply censorships on the incidence data
collected to emulate the low reporting rates of common infections,
and use the censored incidences to construct estimates of the
original infection networks. To mitigate new epidemics, we
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graph partitioning method on the estimated networks to identify
the smallest sets of nodes that, when removed, will efficiently break
the networks up into isolated pieces. Finally, we evaluate the
effectiveness of this targeted strategy by comparing against
traditional untargeted methods. While each of the problems has
been studied independently (see for example [8,18] for network
reconstruction and [19–22] for graph partitioning), to the best of
our knowledge no work has been done applying both methods to
control epidemics.
Methods
At this point in time, we know of no available databases of
common infections that (1) are comprehensive enough for
reconstructing the infection network and (2) have relevant on-
going epidemics to test the proposed strategy. Hence, we used
computer simulations to study the proposed method.
2.1 Artificial Infection Network Generation
Many naturally-occurring networks like the Internet, the World
Wide Web, and biological networks are scale-free and are thus
well described by Barabasi’s preferential attachment model [23].
Others argued, however, that social networks are different as they
show strong clustering of nodes (also called community structures)
and their degree distributions are not power laws [24]. To
specifically reproduce the community structures seen in social and
social-like networks, Holme and Kim modified the preferential
attachment model to incorporate clustering [25]. Newman et al.,
on the other hand, started out with random graphs and
progressively build the social-like degree distribution [26], whereas
Boguna et al. and Jin et al. proposed friendship-formation dynamics
models to generate social-like networks from scratch [27,28].
For our proof-of-concept study, we generate social-like networks
to act as our infection networks. We follow the three intuitive rules
described by Jin, Girvan, and Newman (JGN) in Ref. [28]: (1) the
probability of two individuals meeting is high if they have one or
more mutual friends, and low otherwise; (2) the friendship between
two individuals is reinforced by regular meetings, but decays with
time if they rarely meet; and (3) there is a maximum number of
friends one can have.
Following the discrete algorithm presented in Ref. [28], we first
start with a random network of N nodes and m links. The average
degree of the network (average number of links per node) is given
by SkT~
2m
N
. At each time step, we select nm pairs of nodes that
have at least one mutual friend. This is done by first picking nm
intermediate nodes at random, before choosing two neighbours of
each to become the pairs. In addition to this, we choose nr other
pairs of nodes uniformly at random, with nm.nr. For every pair
that is not already connected, we form a new link between them
provided that both nodes have not reached the maximum number
of friends L. At the end of each time step, we randomly break r
existing links to simulate the friendship decay. We then calculate
the clustering coefficient c of the network using the method by
Schank and Wagner [29]. After the clustering coefficient stops
increasing and only fluctuates about a time-independent long-run
average, we say the network has converged and stop the
simulation. As expected, the clustering coefficients of the
converged networks are much higher than cR&
SkT
N
for random
networks with the same N and ,k..
In generating the infection networks, we set L=50 as the
maximum number of friends a node can have. To produce high
clustering coefficients, we ensure that the mutual friend formation
is dominant over the random friend formation by choosing
nm=400 and nr=100. For simplicity, we choose r=nr+nm=500
such that the total number of links (hence the average degree
,k.) of the initial random network remains more or less constant.
This way, we can generate social-like infection networks with
arbitrary size and average degree by simply adjusting N and ,k.
of the initial random network to the desired values.
2.2 SIR Epidemics
After generating the infection network, we simulate S suscep-
tible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemics. To start the epidemic, we
initialize the network so that all nodes are susceptible. One
random node is then infected to act as seed of the epidemic. At
each time step, every infected node will transmit the disease to its
susceptible neighbours with probability q. After a certain time
interval tR, the infected nodes will recover and become immune to
subsequent infections. This way, the number of infected nodes
grows from the single seed, peaks, and thereafter decreases as more
and more nodes recover and become immune. When there are no
more infected nodes in the network, the epidemic ends and all
nodes are reset to the susceptible state for simulating the next
epidemic.
In this SIR model, the probability q of infecting susceptible
neighbours reflects the characteristic infection rate of the
particular disease over the simulation time step Dt. For a given
time step size Dt, a more infectious disease will have a larger q,
whereas a less infectious disease will have a smaller q. For a given
infectious disease, q will be smaller for a smaller Dt, and larger for a
larger Dt. The simulation time step Dt itself is chosen, for
simplicity, to be roughly equal to the typical incubation and
recovery period of the disease (about 3–5 days for common cold).
This implies that tR<Dt, i.e. the infected nodes recover after one
simulation time step.
When running the simulations, we find that the infection rate q
must be greater than a certain minimum value qmin for the
epidemics to be self-sustaining and cover a large fraction of the
network. We also observe that qmin depends on the network’s
average degree ,k.. A less-connected network with smaller
average degree ,k. requires a larger value of qmin to sustain an
epidemic, as compared to a more highly-connected network with
higher ,k.. Hence, we fine tune the infection probability q so
that 50%–70% of the nodes are infected in one epidemic
simulation. We find that qmin < 0.80 in the case of ,k.=3,qmin
< 0.20 for ,k.=10, and qmin < 0.08 for ,k.=20. Finally, we
note that while it is relatively easy to infect the majority of the
nodes in the network with high ,k., infecting all nodes is
extremely hard. We need q to be very close to one before the
epidemic infects the entire network.
2.3 Censorship and Network Estimation
When collecting incidence data of common and mild diseases,
we expect low incidence reporting rates because: (1) some infected
individuals do not show symptoms (sub-clinical cases); and (2)
some others choose not to consult doctors despite showing
symptoms (unreported cases). In countries where consultation fees
are high, we expect the latter to be dominant. Fortunately, the low
reporting rates are compensated by the large volume of daily
incidences generated by such diseases. We also note that voluntary
reporting rates in Singapore are relatively high because of the low
consultation fees, making the strategy for estimating the infection
network presented below attractive.
To simulate different reporting rates, we censor the incidence
data before using them to estimate the infection network. Here,
the censor rate 0,C,1 is defined as the fraction of incidence data
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estimation. For our study, we vary C from 50% to 85%.
Our network estimation algorithm is essentially a modified JGN
algorithm. To estimate the unknown infection network from the
incidence data, we note that all newly-infected individuals must
have been infected by individuals that were infected one time step
back, as shown in Figure 1. For the epidemic shown in Figure 1,
the incidences are {9}, {5, 12}, {4, 6, 10, 11, 13}, {3, 8} at time
steps t=0, 1, 2, 3 respectively. Suppose some of these incidences
were censored, and we ended up with the censored incidences {9},
{5}, {4, 11, 13}, {8} at time steps t=0, 1, 2, 3 respectively. Based
on these censored incidences, we then draw a tentative link
between nodes 9 and 5, because the infection of node 9 precedes
the infection of node 5. We then draw tentative links between the
pairs (5, 4), (5, 11), (5, 13) because the infection of node 5 precedes
the infection of nodes 4, 11, 13. Finally, we draw a tentative link
between the pairs (4, 8), (11, 8), (13, 8), because the infection of
nodes 4, 11, 13 precedes the infection of node 8.
As we can see, only the links (4, 5) and (5, 9) are correctly
estimated. The rest of the estimated links are all wrong, partly
because of the algorithm, and partly because of the censorship. To
improve the accuracy of our estimated network, all tentative links
are introduced with a weight of w=1.00. Thereafter, the weight of
all links decay by Dw=20.01 every time step. Tentative links are
removed when their weights fall to zero. In the above example, the
links (5, 9), (4, 5), (5, 11), (5, 13), (4, 8), (8, 11), (8, 13) are
introduced at t=1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, and so when the epidemics end
at t=4, their weights would be 0.97, 0.98, 0.98, 0.98, 0.99, 0.99,
0.99 respectively. We then repeat the estimation over more SIR
epidemics. In subsequent epidemics, if an existing estimated link is
reactivated, it is reinforced by adding Dw=1.00 to its weight. We
expect the algorithm to produce mostly wrong links at first.
However, as the weights are decaying with time, most of the
wrongly-estimated links will disappear at the end, because they will
not consistently appear in the estimation process. On the other
hand, correctly-estimated links tend to get constantly reinforced
over multiple epidemics. Hence, we expect the population of
correctly-estimated links to increase over time. More importantly,
we note that existing estimation can always be further refined by
incorporating new incidence data as and when they become
available.
2.4 Network Partitioning
From the network point of view, efficient epidemic mitigation
can be achieved by identifying and targeting the most densely-
connected nodes (also called ‘hubs’) in the infection network.
However, targeting only hubs in the infection network may not be
the most efficient mitigation strategy, because a strongly clustered
network may not break up into fragments after these are removed.
Since we want to fragment the infection network to stop the
epidemic from spreading across the entire network, we perform
equal graph partitioning (EGP) [22] on the estimated network.
EGP identifies the smallest set of nodes which, when removed, will
break the network into isolated chunks of roughly equal sizes.
To start the EGP, we first randomly assign every node into two
groups A and B. We then move all nodes in A that is connected to
B, and all nodes in B that is connected to A, into a third group C
(also called the separator group). Once this is done, there are no
nodes in A that is connected directly to B and vice versa. Following
this we minimize the size of group C by swapping nodes in C with
those in A and B, without introducing direct connections between
A and B. A swap is accepted if it results in a smaller group C. We
perform repeated swaps until no further improvements can be
made. If we then remove this optimal set of nodes in C, the
network will be efficiently broken into two disconnected chunks.
When necessary, the resulting chunks can be further fragmented
into even smaller pieces by applying EGP recursively.
Results
3.1 Preliminary Study
For our preliminary study, we tested our estimation algorithm
on a small social network with N=1,000 nodes, average degree
,k.=3, and clustering coefficient c=0.43 (random network with
the same N and ,k. would have clustering coefficient c* < ,k./
N=0.003). Besides allowing shorter simulations on a desktop
computer, this smaller network has the advantage that the entire
network, together with the simulated epidemics, can be easily
visualized (see Videos S1 and S2).
We simulated S=100 epidemics and censored 70% of the
incidence data before estimating the infection network. The
estimated network is shown in Figure 2, superimposed onto the
original network. The reconstruction is highly accurate in this test
Figure 1. An SIR epidemic spreading through a small network of N=14 nodes. The epidemic starts on node 9 at t=0. Thereafter, nodes 5
and 12 are infected at t=1 by node 9, which recovers and become immune to subsequent infection. At t=2, nodes 4 and 6 are infected by node 5
(which recovers), while nodes 10, 11, and 13 are infected by node 12 (which recovers). Following this, at t=3, node 3 is infected by node 4 (which
recovers), while node 8 is infected by node 6 (which recovers). Nodes 10, 11, and 13 recover without infecting any other nodes. Finally, at t=4 (not
shown), nodes 3 and 8 recover and the epidemic ends. In this figure, susceptible nodes are white, infected nodes are red, recovered nodes are green,
and links responsible for the transmission are colored red for the time step they are activated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022124.g001
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algorithm estimated 738 links correctly and made only 196 wrong
estimates, resulting in 79% estimation accuracy. More important-
ly, the estimation found mostly links between highly connected
‘hubs’ that form the ‘backbones’ of the network. These backbones
play an important role in disease transmissions as they link one
highly-connected cluster (community) to another throughout the
network.
After estimating the infection network, we performed EGP and
found a set of 67 nodes that will efficiently fragment the estimated
network. We then immunized the same 67 nodes on the actual
infection network. To evaluate the effectiveness of the method, we
picked 10 random seeds and ran 500 SIR epidemics each on the
immunized network to find the average number of infected nodes
as a function of time. Using the same seeds, we also ran 500 SIR
epidemics each on the original infection network and found that
EGP immunization reduced the average size of the epidemics by
58%–88% and lowered the average peak incidence rate by 51%–
68% (see Videos S3, S4, S5, and S6).
3.2 Systematic Study
Motivated by the promising result of small network estimation,
we performed systematic studies of larger networks to see how well
these can be estimated. We varied the number of estimated links n,
the censor rate C, the size of the network N, the number of SIR
epidemics S used for estimation, and the average degree of the
network ,k.. The same clustering coefficient of c=0.05 is
maintained across the networks to ensure meaningful compari-
sons.
3.2.1 Accuracy versus number of estimated links. In a
given estimation, there is a trade-off between accuracy and
number of estimated links n. At the end of the estimation,
frequently reinforced links (likely to be the correct ones) will have
weights much higher than those infrequently reinforced links
(likely to be the wrong ones). To determine which tentative links
we would accept as estimated links, we set a cut-off value wC for
the weight. Links with weights above wC will be accepted as
estimated links, otherwise they are rejected. If wC is large, only a
few estimated links are accepted, and most of these will be correct
estimates. On the other hand when wC is small, more estimated
links are accepted but a larger fraction of these will be wrong. Our
simulation results confirmed this and showed that the accuracy
falls off very slowly as a power law in the number of estimated links
n, with power-law exponents much smaller than 1 (Figure 3).
3.2.2 Accuracy versus censor rate C. As common
infections are typically under-reported, it is important to study
how the estimation accuracy varies with censor rate. For a fixed
network with N=10,000 nodes and ,k.=10, we simulated
S=100 SIRs and applied various censor rates C from 50% to
85%. The estimation accuracy is found to decrease as C increases
(Figure 4a). This is expected, as lower censor rate results in more
data available for estimation and thus improves the accuracy.
3.2.3 Accuracy versus number of SIR S. Incidence data
from a single epidemic will not provide a good picture of the
network, because of censorship and history dependence of the
epidemic. For different seeds, the epidemic progresses along
different transmission routes. Thus, even if we could track all
incidences for a given epidemic we are seeing an incomplete
snapshot of the infection network. With censorship, this snapshot is
even more incomplete. This is why we need to accumulate
information from successive epidemics to make consistent and
reliable estimates of the network links that participate in the
Figure 2. Estimation of a small infection network, shown superimposed onto the original network. Blue lines represent correctly
estimated links, whereas red lines represent incorrectly estimated links. Full view of the network (left) and magnified view around the center (right)
are shown, highlighting the highly-connected nodes (hubs) and backbones connecting them. The estimation is based on 100 SIR epidemics and 70%
censor rate. The original infection network has 1,000 nodes, 1,584 links, and average degree ,k.=3. About 60% of total links are estimated with
79% accuracy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022124.g002
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function of the number of different SIR epidemics S used in the
estimation with 50% censor rate. We found the accuracy to
improve with S initially before saturating to 100% as more
incidence data becomes available. It thus appears that faithful
estimation of the infection network is asymptotically possible.
3.2.4 Accuracy versus number of nodes N and average
degree ,k.. Naturally, we expect larger and highly-connected
networks to be more difficult to estimate. To study how the
estimation accuracy varies with N, we performed estimation on
networks with three different sizes N=1,000, 10,000, and 100,000
using data from S=100 epidemics. We also compared the
estimation accuracies for networks with N=10,000 nodes and
two different average degrees ,k.=10 and 20. In Figure 4c–d,
we show that the accuracy falls with increasing network size N and
increasing average degree ,k., as expected.
Summarizing the results of the systematic studies, the estimation
accuracy for a given infection network depends strongly on the
censor rate, the number of epidemics over which incidence data is
accumulated, and the average degree of the network. The
accuracy falls with increasing censor rate, network size, and
average degree, but improves over time as more incidence data
from new epidemics become available.
3.3 Graph Partitioning
3.3.1 Pre-epidemic EGP. Since the preliminary EGP result
in Section 3.1 is encouraging, we tried EGP mitigation on the
larger networks despite the poor estimation accuracy.
We started by estimating an infection network (N=10,000,
,k.=10, and a total of 50,126 links) using incidence data from
100 SIR epidemics and 50% censor rate. The estimated network
has a total of 2,561 nodes and 6,467 estimated links. 1,074 of these
estimated links are correct (16.6% accuracy). Next, we applied
EGP to this estimated network (not to the actual infection network)
and obtained a set of 864 nodes that will efficiently fragment the
estimated network. We then immunized these 864 nodes on the
Figure 3. Log-log plots of estimation accuracy as a function of the number of estimated links n. The censor rates used are (a) 50%, (b)
60%, (c) 70%, and (d) 80%. Red lines show the best linear fits of the data (used to extrapolate and compare accuracies across different censor rates in
Figure 3). The slope a and y-intercept b of the linear fits are: (a) a=(20.256 6 0.006) and b=(0.279 6 0.046); (b) a=(20.291 6 0.008) and b=(0.038 6
0.060; (c) a=(20.322 6 0.008) and b=(20.211 6 0.064); (d) a=(20.275 6 0.014) and b=(21.368 6 0.126). The decay exponents (slope in log-log
plot above) are found to be between 20.24 and 20.32, thus implying that the accuracy actually falls off very slowly with the number of estimated
links n. All estimations are based on 100 SIR epidemics. The actual infection network has N=10,000, ,k.=10, and c=0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022124.g003
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subsequent epidemics. To obtain a non-targeted intervention
benchmark for comparison, we also randomly removed 864 nodes
in the actual infection network. We then ran 100 SIR epidemics
each on the two immunized networks and plot the average
incidence rate as a function of time, as shown in Figure 5a.
Considering the estimated network represents only a small
fraction (0.13) of the actual number of links, and only 16.6% of the
estimated links are correct, the EGP-based mitigation is surprisingly
effective in both slowing down the progress and reducing the peak
incidencerate of the outbreaks. We showthat systematic isolation of
only 8.6% of the total population reduced the peak infection rate by
about 40% and delayed the peak infection time by about 20%, as
compared to the unmitigated case. More importantly, even though
random isolation also reduced and delayed the peak, the targeted
intervention is still significantly better.
The 864 separator nodes identified by EGP are clearly special
on the estimated network (and thus also on the actual network).
However, all the 2,561 nodes identified in the estimation process
are important, because they are on the transmission paths for
nearly all epidemics. As suggested by the referee, removing all
these nodes may bring the infection network below its percolation
threshold, thereby completely stopping all epidemics. To test this
idea, we isolated the 2,561 nodes on the actual network and ran
100 SIR simulations. We found that in about 40 simulations, the
‘epidemics’ infected only 2–5 nodes and died off very quickly after
1 or 2 time steps after starting. For the other 60 simulations, we
observe very slowly circulating epidemics that lasted more than 60
time steps and infected 2,580 nodes on average, with the number
of incidences reaching a peak of 116 cases 28 time steps after the
start.
3.3.2 In-epidemic EGP. The results above were obtained
assuming we can partition the network before the start of each
epidemic. Since it is more realistic to assume we intervene only
after an outbreak has been detected, we also investigated the
effectiveness of the EGP intervention enforced at different times
Figure 4. Systematic studies of the estimation accuracy. We plot the estimation accuracy versus: (a) censor rate C, (b) number of SIR epidemics
S, (c) network size N, and (d) censor rate for different value of average degrees ,k.. Since we cannot precisely stop at arbitrary number of estimated
links by adjusting wc alone, we extrapolate from the linear fits (Figure 2) to obtain and compare accuracies of n=100, 1,000, and 10,000 estimated
links in figures above. The error bars are calculated from the error of fitting parameters, where appropriate. The graphs are obtained with the
following simulation parameter: (a) N=10,000, ,k.=10, and S=100; (b) N=10,000, ,k.=10, and C=50%; (c) ,k.=10, S=100, and C=50%; (d)
N=10,000 and S=100. All networks have c=0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022124.g004
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strategy is still very effective even when it is applied as late as 10
time steps (roughly 30 days) after the start, just 2 time steps away
before the peak. The peak infection rate is reduced by about 20%
and total number of cases by 12%, as compared to the unmitigated
case. Unfortunately, the time of maximum infection rate is not
delayed when EGP is applied at t=10, and is only delayed by
about one time step when intervention is applied at t=2 and t=6
time steps after the start.
Discussion
4.1 Infection network estimation
Based on the results reported in Section 3.3, we have shown that
the proposed intervention based on estimated infection networks is
very effective in limiting the scale and slowing down the spread of
infectious disease epidemics. However, as discussed in Section 3.2,
the estimated infection networks are not always accurate,
especially when the proportion of unreported incidences is high.
Figure 4a suggests that the estimation accuracy goes to zero at
censor rate CT,100%. This implies that it might be difficult to do
network estimation in the US, where censor rates for mild illnesses
are close to 100% because of the expensive medical insurance and
co-payments. However, we stand a better chance of making the
scheme work in Singapore as the low medical cost and the
necessity to obtain medical certificates to stay away from work
promote doctor consultations even for mild symptoms. To further
improve the accuracy, the incidence data can be easily
complemented with other types of relevant data. For instance,
cell-phone and GPS co-location information can be used to rule
out a large proportion of tentative links connecting pairs of
individuals that have never been found in the same location over
the infection time step of about three days. This will reduce the
rate of forming false links significantly, thus improving the
accuracy of the estimation.
Real infection networks are also likely to be dynamic and
changing with time. There are seasonal variations to the infections,
and also seasonal variations to social mobility patterns. For
example, most temperate countries have an annual flu season that
peaks during winter [30–32], whereas tropical countries experi-
ence multiple flu seasons each year [33]. School holidays in June
and December also change the social dynamics drastically, as
students start hanging out more in shopping centers and families
go on vacations [34,35]. With real data, what we are estimating is
effectively the infection network averaged over multiple epidemi-
ological and social seasons. With enough data, it might also be
possible to estimate these seasonal infection networks, and clearly
interventions and mitigations might become more effective with
the added knowledge of how the network varies with time.
However, we believe that even with the averaged infection
network, interventions and mitigations will still be effective enough
to justify its study and estimation.
The N=10,000 network estimated in Section 3.3 for demon-
strating the effectiveness of EGP-based intervention is obtained
from 100 SIR epidemics. In subtropical countries, there is typically
one flu season each year. So if the estimation is based solely on flu,
it would take 100 years to obtain the estimated network. In
Singapore, because of the tropical climate and high population
density, there is anecdotal evidence that epidemics of mild
respiratory infections come around every one or two months.
Assuming there are six epidemics a year, the estimation above will
take a much shorter time of 17 years in this country. The main risk
of using multiple infections to shorten the estimation time is the
increased number of wrong estimates when two epidemics overlap.
However, this is a problem that cell phone and GPS co-location
can help to solve as well.
Finally, we highlight that the estimated network needs not to be
very accurate to be useful. The results of Section 3.3 beautifully
illustrate this, where targeted isolation based on an estimated
network which is only 16.6% accurate is still very effective in
mitigating epidemics (Figure 5a–b). This unexpected effectiveness
of EGP applied on an inaccurately estimated network prompted us
to better understand why this is happening. A deeper look at the
preliminary study which we can visualize suggests that, while the
Figure 5. Effectiveness of EGP-based intervention. (a) 864 nodes identified through EGP on the estimated network were isolated from the
actual network before the start of epidemics. The average infection rate after EGP-based mitigation is compared against average infection rates
without mitigation and with random isolation of 864 nodes. The average number of infected nodes per epidemic after EGP-based mitigation is
decreased to 6,345 nodes, as compared to 7,881 and 6,747 average infected nodes for no mitigation and after random isolation, respectively. (b) The
same EGP-based intervention as in (a), except done at different times after the epidemics have started. The EGP-based strategy is surprisingly
effective on controlling epidemics, with EGP applied even at 10 time step after the start of the epidemics still effective in reducing peak infection
rates and total number of infected nodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022124.g005
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estimation are mostly hubs and are concentrated along the
backbones of the infection network. Hence, removal of these nodes
will effectively slow the advancing epidemic. Naturally, we expect
even better results with a more accurate estimation.
4.2 Equal Graph Partitioning
Effective epidemic control measure is important for mankind as
the problems associated with severe infectious disease can only
increase in severity along with global population growth. To put
this into the proper context, we highlight two most important
features that characterize severe epidemics: (1) the large number of
cases that emerges in relatively short time (surge in hospital load),
and (2) the fast propagation of the disease as compared to
treatment time and development of cure. We will discuss how the
proposed mitigation method addresses these two problems.
For highly-infectious epidemics, the capacities of hospitals are
stretched due to the large number of infected individuals
appearing near the peak of the epidemic. Lack of medical
attention and insufficient resources (medics, vaccines, and
healthcare apparatus) might delay the recovery process and result
to a higher number of casualties than need be. This is why it is
important for an epidemic mitigation strategy to consider peak
load reduction as a primary goal. Delaying the peak infection time,
thus stretching the overall time scale of the epidemic, is also
crucial. When dealing with a deadly epidemic caused by a new
infection agent, chances are we would not have vaccine at hand, or
even a vaccine development program. As development of vaccines
and drugs for new diseases can only begin after cases have been
confirmed and analyzed, the race against the epidemic to develop
and administer such drugs would be inevitable. Delaying the
progress of the epidemic will not only buy time for drug
development, but will also give governments more time in general
to implement other crisis handling measures.
Furthermore, any epidemic mitigation procedure can only be
enforced after the epidemic has started and positive cases have
been confirmed. Mitigation measures applied at the start of
epidemic is ideal but may not be practical. Hence, good
performance when applied late into the epidemic is critical for a
mitigation method to be successful. Figure 5b hints at a the
promising potential our proposed targeted strategy can offer in this
regard, where significant reductions of the peak infection rate and
the total number of infected people are observed even when
applied late into the epidemic. However, the result also suggests
that early implementation is critical in slowing down the epidemic.
Here let us also discuss the impact of the proposed strategy on
privacy as a potential reason to object to its implementation. In a
country like the US, this strategy is unlikely to be adopted no
matter how well it is shown to work in simulation due to privacy
concerns when we selectively isolate individuals according to EGP.
However, the proposed strategy may find a more receptive
audience in a country like Singapore, given that home quarantine
orders have been issued by the Ministry of Health during the
SARS and H1N1 outbreaks. Here we must stress that node
removals as suggested by EGP need not be home quarantine or
any other physical isolation practices. If early vaccine stocks are
available but limited, the EGP nodes should be the ones to receive
it, because of the role they play in disease transmission. We must
nevertheless be wary that this procedure should not be used as a
mean of discrimination.
Finally, we highlight a crucial difference of the proposed
method to traditional strategies. Unlike conventional quarantine,
this intervention involves isolating healthy individuals from the rest
of the infection network. At first this might sounds absurd: ‘‘Why
isolate healthy people and not the infected ones?’’ From network
point of view, however, the reason is clear: by isolating these
people we are intercepting the path of an ongoing epidemic. As
comparison, it is a standard practice in controlling forest fire to cut
or burn down trees ahead of advancing fire to contain it. For
infectious diseases no one has imagined this intervention possible,
but with an estimated infection network our proof-of-concept
results are impressive. If all nodes on the entire estimated network
are isolated, the results are even more impressive: for our
N=10,000 network with ,k.=10, we find propagating epidem-
ics in only 60% of the simulations. In these propagating epidemics,
the epidemic peak with intervention is less than 1/10 the epidemic
peak without intervention, while the total number of infections
with intervention is 1/3 that without intervention. Also, instead of
peaking at t=12 and ending at t=20 without intervention, the
epidemic peaks at t=28 and ends at t=60 with intervention. In
terms of actual durations, removing all nodes on the estimated
network stretches two-month epidemics to over half a year.
However, about 1/4 of the population needs to be isolated,
compared to only about 9% of the population for EGP
intervention. A separate systematic study will be necessary to
understand how effective and efficient this more aggressive
intervention strategy can be.
In conclusions, we have presented in this work a proof-of-
concept study of a novel epidemic mitigation method based on
equal graph partitioning of the estimated infection network. We
used computer simulations to study and show the effectiveness of
the method. First, we followed the intuitive JGN method to
generate artificial social network of various sizes but with roughly
the same clustering characteristic to serve as the infection
networks. We then simulated SIR epidemics on the artificial
infection networks, recorded the incidences, and applied censor-
ship with rates between 50% and 85% to mimic low reporting
rates for mild infections. We then used the remaining incidence
data to construct an estimate of the infection network using a
modified JGN algorithm. We found that the estimation accuracy
falls with increasing censor rate, average degree, and size of the
network, but improves as more data from multiple epidemics are
incorporated.
With the estimated infection networks at hand, we applied the
Equal Graph Partitioning (EGP) algorithm to remove the smallest
sets of nodes that will efficiently fragment the estimated networks.
We then immunized the same set of nodes on the actual infection
network before simulating subsequent epidemics. We compared
the effectiveness of the targeted strategy to an untargeted method
that randomly isolates the same number of nodes, and showed that
the former outperforms the latter in decreasing and delaying the
peak of the epidemics, as well as reducing the total number of
infections. We also applied the proposed strategy at different times
after the epidemic has started and showed that it is still effective in
decreasing the peak infection rate and total number of cases even
when applied late into the epidemic. In particular, we demon-
strated that the EGP based strategy is surprisingly effective in
mitigating epidemics even when the estimated network is not very
accurate. Through visualizing small network, we find that in spite
of the large number of wrongly estimated links, the nodes
appearing in the estimated network are concentrated along the
backbones of the actual network and thus play important roles in
the disease transmission.
Supporting Information
Video S1 SIR epidemic on an artificial social network.
In this video, an SIR epidemic spreads through an artificial social
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,k.=3.168 and clustering coefficient C=0.3928. The artificial
social network is generated using the Jin-Girvan-Newman
algorithm (Jin, Girvan, and Newman, 2001). The transmission
probability used for this SIR epidemic is p=0.80, and infected
nodes recover after tR=1 time step.
(WMV)
Video S2 Another SIR epidemic on the artificial social
network. In this video, another SIR epidemic starts from a
different seed on the artificial Jin-Girvan-Newman social network
with N=1,000 nodes, 1,584 links, average degree ,k.=3.168
and clustering coefficient C=0.3928. The transmission probability
for this SIR epidemic remains at p=0.80, and infected nodes
again recover after tR=1 time step.
(WMV)
Video S3 SIR epidemic on the EGP-immunized artifi-
cial social network. I. In this video, an SIR epidemic spreads
through the artificial Jin-Girvan-Newman social network after
EGP immunization. The EGP immunization is based on the 475-
node, 934-link network estimated over S=100 SIR epidemics
from the 1,000-node, 1,584-link network, using the algorithm
described in the text, and a weight cutoff of wc=7. Of the 934
estimated links, 738 are correct, giving an accuracy of 79.01%.
The EGP procedure then identifies 67 separator nodes, and when
these are removed, the immunized network has 1,359 links
remaining.
(WMV)
Video S4 SIR epidemic on the EGP-immunized artifi-
cial social network. II. In this video, we start an SIR epidemic
from a second seed on the EGP-immunized artificial Jin-Girvan-
Newman social network. The original network consists of 1,000
nodes and 1,584 links, whereas the estimated network EGP is
based on consists of 475 nodes and 934 links. 67 separator nodes
identified by the EGP procedure are removed from the original
network, giving an immunized network with 1,359 links.
(WMV)
Video S5 SIR epidemic on the EGP-immunized artifi-
cial social network. III. In this video, we start an SIR epidemic
from a third seed on the EGP-immunized artificial Jin-Girvan-
Newman social network. The original network consists of 1,000
nodes and 1,584 links, whereas the estimated network EGP is
based on consists of 475 nodes and 934 links. 67 separator nodes
identified by the EGP procedure are removed from the original
network, giving an immunized network with 1,359 links.
(WMV)
Video S6 SIR epidemic on the EGP-immunized artifi-
cial social network. IV. In this video, we start an SIR epidemic
from a fourth seed on the EGP-immunized artificial Jin-Girvan-
Newman social network. The original network consists of 1,000
nodes and 1,584 links, whereas the estimated network EGP is
based on consists of 475 nodes and 934 links. 67 separator nodes
identified by the EGP procedure are removed from the original
network, giving an immunized network with 1,359 links.
(WMV)
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